En même temps, et comme mentionné, « la demande d'un procès équitable étend ses ailes aux actions de l'autorité d'enquête » ; Bien que l'interrogé n'ait pas le droit d'exprimer ses arguments avant l'émission du mandat de perquisition, « les droits de l'interrogé ne doivent pas être annulés par cela. La violation de ces droits doit satisfaire aux critères de légalité et de proportionnalité. On peut dire que dans de nombreux cas, les droits de l'interrogé sont « différés » en un certain sens, de l'étape de l'interrogatoire à la phase de procès. À la dernière étape, l'interrogé peut retirer intégralement ses revendications, et si elles s'avèrent qu'elles ont été violées illégalement, le tribunal leur accordera le poids et les implications appropriés » (paragraphe 7 de mon avis). C'est la situation concernant les fouilles d'ordinateurs et de téléphones, et c'est aussi le cas dans d'autres contextes dans le cadre d'une enquête – des contextes impliquant des violations tout aussi graves des droits constitutionnels, comme la possibilité d'émettre un mandat d'arrêt ex parte. La nécessité et la nécessité de protéger le public et ses droits nécessitent parfois diverses actions. Même dans ce cas, bien sûr, un contrôle judiciaire est nécessaire, mais il est effectué ex parte, et les droits et revendications du défendeur lui sont réservés pour l'étape suivante de la procédure.
La deuxième question qui était au cœur de l'affaire Shimon était la possibilité de faire appel d'une décision sur une demande de mandat de perquisition – même avant la perquisition – par voie d'appel, d'appel ou de réexamen. À mon avis, il a été expliqué que de telles procédures d'appel ne sont pas prescrites par la loi, contredisent le cours des procédures législatives pertinentes, sont incompatibles avec le reste des lois sur l'enquête pénale, et risquent de nuire à l'efficacité et à la rapidité des enquêtes. C'est le cas en Israël, et c'est aussi la situation dans les autres pays démocratiques examinés dans le jugement.
- La seconde audience supplémentaire dans cette procédure est dans le jugement Miscellaneous Criminal Applications 1758/20 [publié à Nevo] (l'affaire Urich). Dans le même cas, la question de la manière dont le tribunal doit examiner une demande de mandat de perquisition sur un téléphone a été discutée, dans les circonstances où une fouille illégale du téléphone a été effectuée avant le dépôt de la demande. Quand le tribunal devra-t-il rejeter une demande de mandat de perquisition uniquement – ou du moins principalement – à la lumière de la fouille illégale antérieure effectuée sur l'appareil ? Dans l'affaire Urich et dans cette procédure, plusieurs réponses ont été présentées. Ce qu'elles ont toutes en commun, c'est que dans le cadre d'une demande de mandat de perquisition, il est pertinent que le fait qu'une fouille illégale ait été effectuée dans le passé, et que la possibilité que ce fait – dans le contexte des autres circonstances de l'affaire – détermine le sort de la demande de mandat ne doit pas être totalement exclue. Le différend concerne la question de savoir quel est le poids de ce fait, en soi, et de quelle manière il doit être examiné parallèlement à d'autres considérations. Parmi les approches présentées lors de la première procédure et dans cette procédure, je suis d'accord avec l'approche du juge G. Kara dans ses détails, telle que présentée dans le premier jugement et affinée ici – et à mon avis, celle de mon collègue le Président et de mon collègue le juge Y. Amit est proche de cette approche :
Premièrement, ce n'est que dans des cas exceptionnels et rares qu'une fouille illégale précédant le dépôt de la demande sera la seule considération pour son rejet. Deuxièmement, ce fait doit être pris en compte, lors de l'examen de la demande, conformément à ce qui a été énoncé dans une audience pénale supplémentaire 5852/10 État d'Israël c. Shemesh, IsrSC 65(2) 363 (2012), et notamment : en tenant compte du stade de l'enquête, que nous traitons d'une demande de mandat de perquisition, en se référant au matériel auquel la demande se rapporte, au « poids » des éléments probants dans le cadre de l'enquête, à la nature de l'illégalité, aux circonstances de l'enquête et à d'autres données pouvant être pertinentes dans chaque affaire (paragraphe 12 de l'avis du juge Kara dans l'affaire Urich ; paragraphes 12 à 15 de son avis dans cette procédure). Je conviens également qu'il est difficile de donner du poids, dans le cadre de l'audience ex parte, à la question du lien entre la fouille illégale effectuée et la demande de mandat de perquisition, compte tenu de la difficulté à comprendre pleinement la signification de ce fait compte tenu de l'étape de la procédure et de la manière dont l'audience s'est déroulée (paragraphe 14 de l'avis de mon collègue dans cette procédure). J'ajouterais que les questions liées à de telles questions comportent une composante factuelle mais aussi une composante normative – la « causalité juridique » – dans laquelle la cour doit prendre en compte des considérations supplémentaires au-delà du lien factuel entre la perquisition illégale et la demande de mandat de perquisition, ce qui est douteux qu'il soit douteux qu'elle puisse être pleinement examinée dans le cadre d'une demande de mandat de perquisition (comparer, par exemple, l'appel pénal 4988/08 Farhi c. État d'Israël, IsrSC 65(1) 626, paragraphe 21 de l'avis du juge A. E. Levy (2011)).
- I will add that a central emphasis in my view is the authority, role, and advantage of the court hearing the criminal proceeding, when examining the significance of the illegal search according to the tests of the Issacharov rule, over the court hearing the request for a search warrant. The criminal procedure court has a much broader perspective, in terms of the evidence that can be laid out and the arguments that can be raised. It is not for nothing that there is a "division of labor" between the criminal proceeding itself and "ancillary" proceedings, such as search or arrest proceedings. Thus, for example, in the framework of the arrest or search proceedings, the decision can also be based on evidence that cannot be presented in the framework of the main proceeding, such as the defendant's criminal record, or inadmissible evidence that establishes a request for a search warrant. This expresses the difference in relation to the role of the court in the two proceedings. Instance and its role, the procedure and its purpose. A district court that hears a criminal proceeding against a defendant of sexual offenses, for example, sits in the Telta Circuit, while the defendant's arrest in the same proceeding is heard before a single judge. Each panel and its field of occupation. It deals with arrest and release, and it deals with the conduct of the trial and the determination of guilt or innocence.
This division is desirable, and is rooted in enacted and detailed procedures. For example, the judge hearing the detention until the end of the proceedings will be from the same court as the panel hearing the guilt. In the case of detention for the purposes of investigation and requests for a search warrant, on the other hand, a magistrate judge will adjudicate, regardless of which court has jurisdiction to hear the indictment that may be filed - whether it is a simple theft offense or a murder offense. This is the relevant division for our case. The magistrate's court judge discusses a request for a search warrant, while the panel hearing the indictment is supposed to hear the claims by virtue of the Issacharov rule. The application of this rule requires a complex balance, and in order to carry it out properly, this must be done by the court that hears the case and decides the law. On the other hand, the role of the court hearing a request for search warrants is to decide whether it is justified to carry out the search. The considerations for this are different from the considerations that must be taken into account in the framework of the judgment. The areas of concern of the various courts and the distinction between the various proceedings and their role must be preserved. Just as the judge hearing the main proceeding is not supposed to discuss the question of whether there was justification for granting a search warrant in the first place, so the judge hearing a request for a search warrant is not supposed to assess the status of the search products in the framework of the judgment. His role is different - to discuss the relevant data at the stage of the request for a search warrant. Hence, he is entitled and even obligated to exercise his discretion in the matter of the search. Of course, in this framework, considerations of legality are also relevant. Therefore, if it is a matter of clear and clear illegality, the court may consider the matter and give it exclusive weight in exceptional and rare cases. Thus, not with regard to the disqualification of evidence in a trial, but with respect to the question of whether or not to issue a search warrant. It is not its role to look at it from a broad perspective like the court of inquiry.
- As stated, I agree with key parts of my colleague the President's opinion. I consider special and principled importance in her rulings regarding the construction of judicial discretion and the conduct of the investigating authorities, which are intended to ensure the proportionality of the infringement of the rights of the interrogee already at the stage of the issuance of the search warrant and its execution, even before the protection of his rights in the framework of the main proceeding. Thus, for example, clarifying the manner in which a request for a search warrant should be submitted - with as much detail as possible and delimiting the request in advance; clarifying the considerations that the court must consider in the framework of its decision; and the manner in which the search itself should be carried out and documented. There is no denying that there is a difficulty in the fact that a request for a search warrant is discussed ex parte, and is decided on the basis of material that a representative of the investigating authority submits to the judge without review by another party. As stated, this is a practical necessity, and hence its justification. Search warrants are a legitimate and necessary tool in the framework of the investigation of crimes. However, holding a hearing ex parte imposes a duty on the authority and the court to strictly adhere to the provisions of the law. It is therefore of great importance that the court, even if it is limited in its "technological" knowledge, should not serve as a "rubber stamp" for requests for a search warrant by telephone and computer. My colleague's important determinations on this issue govern order in an area that requires order, are integrated into the law's requirement for judicial supervision of the proportionality of the warrant, and are in line with the guidelines and procedures of the investigating authorities.
In this sense, I will allow myself to say that I see the President's decision as a kind of "handbookor a "guide for the perplexed" for requesting search warrants and deciding on the requests. Despite the large number of requests for search warrants and the sense of "routineness" that can characterize them, the court hearing the matter must carefully consider it in its concrete circumstances. There are two aspects to this determination. First, it must exercise its discretion. The relevant test is the criteria for granting a search warrant. This matter is not measured by the percentage of requests received for a search warrant, but rather by the manner in which the requests are discussed. The court must engage in the work and consider the matter. Second, the dialogue between the police and the court is of great importance. If the request for a search warrant is missing, it should be rejected and it should be made clear to the police that it should be resubmitted, if such a completion might help. The importance of the dialogue between the court and the authority lies in the judicial supervision it creates over the concrete case - supervision that no body can do better, given the impossibility of obtaining a search warrant and the fact that the defense attorney is not exposed to the picture in any case and cannot argue the matter. Go ahead and learn that the court must consider the matter when requesting a search warrant, including rejecting requests that are not as clear as required, or that do not include all the material. As stated, I see the President's decision as an important step that will serve as an aid to the court in conducting a hearing in accordance with the requirements of the law.
- A point on which my position differs from that of my colleague the President is the existence of exceptional cases, in which it will be possible to discuss an application for a search warrant - prior to a decision on it - in the presence of both parties. In the Shimon case, I expressed reservations about the creation of exceptions to the rule of ex parte hearing, but I did not rule on this question, since we did not hear arguments in the matter and it was not necessary to decide it (paragraph 9 of my opinion). Now, in the framework of another hearing, this issue was also at the center of the stage. I will therefore clarify my position, according to which there is no room to establish exceptions to the rule of ex parte hearing.
At the outset, it should be noted, as my colleague, Justice Kara also held (paragraph 4 of his opinion in this proceeding), that contrary to what has been claimed, there is no "custom" or "custom" to sometimes hear requests for a search warrant in the presence of both parties. We have been presented with a few exceptions to the rule of ex parte hearing, and these cases are also from the last two years, which have not taken root. We are therefore dealing with an attempt at change, and not a practice. Second, and to the substance of the matter, I clarified above that the hearing of a request for a search warrant is supposed to be held ex parte, in accordance with the words of legislation and laws dealing with decisions at the investigation stage, as well as the purposes of the law and the weight given to it to the interest in conducting speedy and efficient investigations. These and other considerations, which will now be detailed, lead, in my opinion, to the conclusion that there is no room for making exceptions to the rule of ex parte hearing. My reservations are on two levels - on the general level, and on the individual level with respect to the examples brought in the opinion of my colleague the President.
- On the general level, I will relate to two points - the difficulty that arises from the recognition of exceptional cases, and the manner in which it is appropriate to shape the order of discussion in such cases.
First, and as I noted in the Shimon case, in the context of interrogation proceedings, the rule must be preserved against the exception. I have brought the example of interrogation material at the stage of detention for days. The sweeping rule is that the interrogation material will be presented for the court's review only. Such an arrest certainly violates the suspect's liberty, and it can be assumed that there are cases in which the circumstances of the case make it possible to disclose the material to the defense attorney's review. Why, therefore, was it not determined that this possibility should be examined, and in exceptional cases where the provision of the material does not prejudice the interrogation to allow the defense attorney to review it? "The decision is that at the interrogation stage it is preferable to act in a certain procedural manner, not necessarily on the assumption that there are no cases in which it would have been possible to act differently, but rather out of recognition that there is no room to examine each case on its own merits. This will lead to hearings... Does a particular case belong to a rule or an exception" (paragraph 9 of my opinion). Even if in practice the number of exceptions will be small and they will be statistically rare, their very existence and the need to decide whether it is a rule or an exception may - in these circumstances of the need for an efficient and speedy investigation - harm the purposes of the law. Another illustration of this point is the absence of appeal proceedings against a decision regarding a search warrant. If there are exceptional cases in which a hearing will be held in the presence of both parties, why not recognize the existence of appeal proceedings in exceptional cases? My answer to the difficulty pointed out by my colleague Justice D. Barak-Erez is that just as the legislature did not create an exception with regard to the right of appeal (and I do not agree that this matter should be "circumvented" by easing the criteria for the intervention of the High Court of Justice in the matter), so there is no room for creating exceptions with regard to the manner of the hearing.