The witness, Mrs. Avraham: I'm sorry I don't have anything to say about it, how do I expect him to get The apartment? He wanted the apartment anyway, he wanted to complete the The deal, so how did he expect Sorry so how did he expect, no problem what Let me know, I will answer.
Adv. Friedman: So you claim that you handed over the apartment at some point?
The witness, Mrs. Avraham: Otherwise he wouldn't have paid me the money, yes, as far as I'm concerned, I did.
Adv. Friedman: Did you give it or didn't you give it away?
The witness, Mrs. Avraham: I delivered.
Adv. Friedman: When did you give it up?
The witness, Mrs. Avraham: On the day I received the money, on December 12"
[See p. 31 of the transcript, lines 5-15].
- With regard to the plaintiff's feeble claim of a fundamental breach of the sale agreement due to the "existence of foreclosures", I will point out that this argument has no procedural basis, since the statement of claim did not ask for remedies related to this at all [see paragraphs 3 and 24 of the statement of claim], and in any case - since the second foreclosure was imposed only on November 4, 2021, since the manner of removing the first foreclosure was settled in the sale agreement itself, since the completion of the transaction and the settlement of the matter was delayed not because of this but in the circumstances described in sections 27-36 above, and since the foreclosures were removed as part of its completion, even this suppressed claim has no legal basis.
- Omissions - I will leave the question of whether "possession of an asset expresses a factual state of proximity to the property, to such an extent and in such circumstances that are accepted by the environment as sufficient to express control of the property by preventing it from others" [see, "Possession," Y. Weissman, Mishpat Studies 15, 1999, p. 11], and since "the accepted interpretation of the Sale Law is that our law does not require physical delivery" [see Civil Appeal 184-188 "Tzur" Insurance Company in Tax Appeal v. Baruch Hadad, IsrSC 40(3)1 (1986)] - The defendants can be seen as having carried out the obligation to deliver possession of the apartment in the circumstances that arose, and not only as those who fulfilled it approximately as aforesaid.
The Counterclaim - Unnecessary Constraint:
- In the entirety of the aforesaid I did not find any substance in the counterclaim either, as will be detailed below.
- First, the defendants' need for additional legal counsel due to the exceptional circumstances that were created, until the contract is adapted to them and the transaction is completed, as described above, does not establish a legal cause of action against the plaintiff.
- Second, it is difficult to view the same provision in the sale agreement regarding the delivery of the apartment AS IS, as a norm that suffers from an interpretation according to which it also encompassed in advance the condition of the apartment following the fall of part of the building, and thus established an undertaking by the plaintiff to receive possession of the apartment even in this state of affairs [and see also the only exception included in this provision regarding "natural and reasonable wear"].
- Third, as we have concluded above, the plaintiff received possession of the apartment in practice, through the existence of an associate, and therefore, in the exceptional circumstances that arose until the completion of the transaction, there is no reason to obligate her to pay arrears interest until the date on which the consideration was finally completed.
- Finally, the defendants admitted that they received insurance benefits in the sum of ILS 40,000 and attributed the receipt of these benefits to their damages as a result of the delay in completing the sale agreement [see p. 36 of the transcript, lines 35-37].
Claim Remuneration:
- In the entirety of the aforesaid, the claim is dismissed. The counterclaim is also liable to be dismissed.
- Since it was the plaintiff who dragged the defendants into the proceeding in filing this absurd lawsuit, and they were forced to deal with it as much as they could, including by way of filing a counterclaim and by examining measure for measure, what they saw as a "blatant case of greed and abuse of legal proceedings" on the part of the plaintiff, in accordance with the set of principles and conditions set forth in sections 151-153 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, and according to the references provided by the defendants in this regard, including a copy of the fee agreement with their attorney, which according to his language is not dependent on the filing of the counterclaim, the plaintiff will pay the defendants, jointly and severally, within 30 days attorney's fees in the total amount of ILS 35,100.
Given today, June 25, 2025, in the absence of the parties.